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Abstract 
This paper examines the existence and characterization of pure 
strategy Nash equilibria in multiple-object auction games in which 
buyers face a binding constraint on exposure. There are five major 
results. First, symmetric Nash equilibria exist if and only if there 
are two or less buyers and two or less items. Second, a Nash equilibrium 
may not exist if the seller sets a positive reservation bid. Third, 
asymmetric solutions to symmetrically parameterized games typically 
involve "high-low" strategies: buyers submit positive bids only on 
some restricted subset of the items. Fourth, Nash equilibria typically 
generate zero "profits" to the buyers. Fifth, when asymmetric solutions 
exist and the buyers are identical, these solutions are never unique. 
I • INTRODUCTION 
This paper has two major objectives. The first is to show that 
the incorporation of exposure constraints into the decision problem of 
bidding agents may dramatically change the character of "solutions" to 
an auction game, A second, more fundamental objective is to demonstrate 
that a Nash equilibrium is of questionable value as a solution concept 
for auction games. It is shown that Nash equilibria exist only 
occasionally and, when they do, often exist non-uniquely. The non-
uniqueness or non-existence problem indicates that alternative solution 
concepts might be more accurate predictors of behavior in many auction 
situations. Because auctions are frequently used allocation mechanisms, 
one of the more important characteristics of theoretical models of 
auctions is that the results be reasonably consistent with observed 
data. Though more empirical work remains to be done, the preliminary 
indications are that the model developed in this paper compares favorably 
with previous work in this regard. 
II. MULTIPLE-OBJECT AUCTIONS
Multiple-object auctions, such as those conducted by the United 
States Geological Survey for outer continental shelf oil and gas leases, 
represent an important type of market structure for the allocation of 
scarce, lumpy objects. Surprisingly, the economics literature on this 
subject is virtually nonexis.tent. Before discussing briefly the work 
that has been done on this subject, a few distinctions should be made 
about specific auction institutions. 
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First of all, this paper examines sealed-bid auctions rather 
than oral auctions. Second, it examines multiple-object rather than 
,single-object auctions, In a single-object auction, each participant 
submits at most one bid for whatever item is being sold. A participant 
either submits the highest bid and is a winner, or goes home empty-
handed. 
A multiple-object auction consists of at least two single-
object subauctions in which a bidder may submit losing bids in several 
subauctions yet still win something. A multiple-object auction can be 
conducted either sequentially or simultaneously. In case it is 
sequential, participants may use information from earlier subauctions in 
deciding strategies for later subauctions, This information might be 
very useful, For example two items for sale may be highly complementary, 
such as a right shoe and a left shoe. The information that the bidder 
has at the beginning of the second auction -- specifically, knowledge 
of who won the first auction -- is of great value to him, Ruling out 
1 secondary markets, the second .•shoe has no value to a bidder who has lost the
first auction, but it is of considerable value to the winner of the first 
auction. In a simultaneous auction, all bids are submitted before the 
outcome on any subauction has been revealed. Bids in the auction are 
vectors, with each component corresponding to a subauction. 
Auctions can also be distinguished by the message space of the 
bidders. For example, in many contractual agreements bids are submitted 
in which the cost, time of completion, product quality and other variables 
may jointly determine the winning competitive bid. This paper ignores 
multi-variate bidding and deals only with auctions in which a bid is 
a scalar, price. The message space of an auction must also specify 
the subsets of the set of items to be sold on which bids are to be 
submitted. For example, bidders may be permitted to submit sealed 
tenders for every subset of the set of items being auctioned. The 
message space considered here is one in which bids may be submitted 
only on singleton subsets. Thus, the auction institution examined in 
this paper is a simultaneous, multiple-object discriminatory auction. 
The focus of much of the bidding literature in the past has 
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been on the choice of bids in single-object auctions. Implicit in such 
analysis is the view that little is lost by analyzing a multiple-object 
auction as a series of independent single-object auctions. But single-
object auction models fail to explain a number of empirical phenomena. 
An example is the bidding behavior in auctions for offshore and outer 
continental shelf drilling rights, 
One of the most striking observations is that two companies 
with identical information often bid much differently. Capen, Clapp 
and Campbell (1971) document.this .phenomenon in the 1969 North.Slope
auction, They found that two joint explorers, Humble and ARCO, bid 
much differently on individual tracts, although neither consistently 
bid much greater than the other on all 55 tracts.
2 
Some authors 
interpret this to mean that these two companies simply imputed much 
different value estimates to the same information. While different 
companies will interpret the same exploration data as indicating 
different amounts of oil and gas, it is hard to believe that this can 
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explain as much variation in bids as was observed. On one tract Humble 
bid 17 times as much as ARCO bid and on another the ARCO bid was 33 
times as much as Humble's. 
One possible alternative explanation of such divergent bids 
is that the two companies used randomized, or mixed, strategies. This 
could result in significantly different bids, even if the companies 
made identical value estimates. A second explanation is that the 
companies faced bidding constraints. For example each company might 
1have a "target" number of tracts it wants to win, or a maximum. 
total bonus it can afford to pay, or some mix of these two objectives. 
This emphasizes an important limitation in previous models of optimal 
bidding in auctions. When more than one item is being sold, the 
objective function of a firm may not be simply the cross product of the 
expected net values of each of the items and the probabilities of 
winning each. In many situations the net value of an item is linked 
with the total number of items that are won. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1979) have constructed a "garage
sale" model for the amount one should bid in each of several simultaneous 
auctions for identical goods, where the value of the first item won is 
X > 0 and the value of each subsequent item an agent wins is O. Their 
analysis assumes an oral English auction, rather than sealed bids. The 
questions they ask are how many auctions to enter and how much to bid 
in each auction, In particular, they search for a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. In one special case in which the number of bidders and 
the number of items are equal to n, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber claim 
that if the number of auctions an agent can enter is limited to two, 
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then as n goes to infinity the optimal Nash strategy to bid high on one 
randomly selected item and low on another. 
There are a number of modifications of their model which are 
worth examining. These include: 
(1) looking at the case where n is finite, rather than focusing 
on asymptotic results; 
(2) examining the case where the number of agents does not equal 
the number of items ; 
(3) ·allowing agents to bid on as many items as they wish>; and 
(4) introducing an explicit constraint on the total value of the 
bids, 
A few attempts have been made by past authors to incorporate 
explicit bidding constraints. Sakaguchi (1961) makes some progress 
characterizing Nash equilibrium pure strategy solutions when there are 
two items and two bidders. He offers an incomplete proof of a 
proposition which is presented (and correctly proved) as theorem 1 in 
this paper, Rothkopf (1977) formulates a decision-theoretic model of 
a bidder' s optimal strategy in simultaneous auctions with a constraint 
on exposure, given a known expected payoff function, the only argument 
of which is an agent's own bid. The payoff function is also additively 
separable in the n objects at auction. Equilibrium strategies are not 
discussed, 
Griesmer·and Shubik (1963) and Cook, Kirby and Mehndiratta 
(1975) deal with constrained, simultaneous multi-object auctions in a 
slightly different context. Both papers assume that the bidders are 
bidding to sell (lowest bid wins) , and have a resource constraint which 
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limits the number of auctions they can win. Cook, Kirby, and Mehndiratta 
(1975) use an "expected" exposure constraint rather than a certain 
exposure constraint. Griesmer and Shubik (1963) deal primarily with the 
case in which agents face the constraint that they must bid identically 
in all subauctions. The authors speculate that solutions often do 
not exist if different bids are allowed. 
III. BIDDING CONSTRAINTS 
The above authors have made an important contribution to the 
theory of competitive bidding by suggesting that solutions to an auction 
game can change if the total net payoff to an agent is not simply the 
sum of the net payoffs in each separate auction. 
Nonlinear payoff functions apparently are present among agents 
bidding for outer continental shelf gas and oil leases. There is 
evidence that firms face constraints that limit the number of tracts they 
want to win. For example oil companies which win a substantial number 
of leases in a sale, sometimes resell some of them to other companies.
3 
One can imagine a number of internal and external forces which might 
lead a firm to limit the number of tracts it bids on or the total amount 
of its winning bids. Because a firm does not have perfect instantaneous 
access to an infinite supply of capital at a constant rate of interest, 
the leasing division of a firm is likely to face a budget constraint. For 
this reason, one would expect that both the cash outlay for winning bids 
and the total development expenditures on all tracts won must be 
constrained. One might object by saying that although they face this 
constraint, it should not affect their bidding strategy so long as there 
is a secondary market in leases, Unfortunately there is a fault in 
that logic. If a firm submits the winning bid, it probably means that 
its estimate of the value of the tract was greater than all other 
valuations. Thus it is unlikely that the firm will receive as high a 
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price in the secondary market as what it paid for the tract, Compounding 
this problem is that the attempt to resell the tract sends a signal to 
other firms that the tract is not worth as much to the firm as was 
originally believed. 4 For all the other firms know, the winning firm
might have just noticed an error in its value estimate and for this reason 
wants to unload the tract. Hence a firm would not expect to obtain a 
price for the item as great as the bonus it paid in the auction. 
There are several ways one might wish to formalize the budget 
constraint. Perhaps the most realistic is to postulate that each firm 
has a loss function, L (C) , in which C is the total amount of capital used 
to extract value from the items it wins, In the case of oil tracts the 
cost of exploration, purchase and development of each tract is 
where 
E. 
J 
pre-auction exploration costs of tract j 
bj bid on tract j 
oj = 1 if bj was the unique winning bid. 
= 0 if bj was a losing bid, 
development costs of the tracts won. 
(Alternatively, -D. can be thought of as the 
J 
capital obtained for j on a secondary market, 
if the item is resold instead of developed. )  
One would expect that L' (C) > 0 and L11(C) > O, to reflect 
costs of rapid expansion, increasing cost of capital in the lending 
market, and other costs which are not directly incorporated in C, If L 
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is a smooth convex function of C then it can be loosely interpreted as .a 
"soft" budget constraint, in the sense that the money cost of exploration 
purchase and development of tracts understates the true cost to the firm. 
A "hard" budget constraint is an extreme case in which there 
exists some M such that L (C) = oo for C > M. Thus a second representation 
of the budget constraint might require that in equilibrium (or in the 
case of a mixed strategy equilibrium, expected in equilibrium) 5 a constraint 
C :5 M, can be satisfied. 
Under the above formulation, one could model the firm' s 
decision problem as being either static or sequential, In the sequential 
case, the firm first makes exploration decisions, then bidding decisions, 
and finally development decisions. 
The model used in this paper postulates a "hard" budget 
constraint for reasons of analytical convenience, Exploration and 
development costs are ignored and thus the decision problem of a firm in 
static rather than sequential, The constraint faced by each agent,.i, 
n 
is: l This has been ref erred to in the literature as a 
j=l 
constraint on exposure. This constraint makes the problem at hand a 
9 
6 special case of a Colonel Blotto game. Blackett (1954) describes this 
type of game the following way: 
Two players contending N independent battlefields distribute 
their forces to the battlefields before knowing the opposing 
deploymen.t. The payoff on the i th battlefield is given by a 
function Pi (x,y) depending only on the battlefield and the 
opposing forces x and y committed to the battlefield by A and 
B, The payoff of the game as a whole is the sum of the 
payoffs on the individual battlefields.
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In our case, armies are dollars and battlefields are items. 
What makes our game a rather perverse Blotto game from the military 
standpoint is the particular nature of the payoff function. If you win a 
battle, you lose all your forces -- but gain the fort. If you lose a 
battle, you lose no forces, ·but fail to gain the fort, While this may 
not seem realistic on a battlefield it describes an auction quite adequately. 
IV. THE MODEL 
In general, participants will be indexed by the superscript 
i, items will be indexed by the subscript j. Let: 
v: the value of item j to participant i J 
the budget of participant i 
the bid of participant i on item j 
I the number of participants 
J the number of items 
The budget constraint imposed in this model is that 
J 
(1) l 
j=l 
i A pure strategy for agent i, a , is a J-vector of 
positive numbers. Thus the strategy space for any participant is 
i, . .  . , J} 
* 
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.where bj is the seller' s reservation bid. It will be demonstrated below 
that the presence of a strictly positive reservation bid may alter 
bidding strategies profoundly, 
A pure strategy ai E Ei is feasible if ai · 1 < Mi 
The subset of R; which includes only and·all feasible pure strategies 
is Ei. 
A pure strategy is full if ai 
· 1 = M
i, The subset of Ei 
-i which includes only and all full pure strategies is E • 
A feasible mixed strategy of participant i is a distribution 
function Fi (•) defined over Ei. 
A mixed strategy is full if the domain of F is E
i.
i +· i 1 I The payoff functi'on, 1T (Vi, M , a a ) f r i· di' id 1 · , • • .  , , o n v ua i, 
1 I where a ,  . . .  , a  are strategies of all the players is assumed to be: 
i 1T 
J 
Mi + l 
j=l 
. . .  , 
where 
o� 1 if b� > b� v k f i 
J J J 
0 if i <b� some k f i b. J J 
Tie-breaking Rule: If several participants in the auction tie for 
the winning bid on an item, they evenly divide the cost and ownership 
of the item: 
+ 
where K is the number of agents submitting identical winning bids, 
i 
equal to bj. 
Throughout the remaining analysis, four assumptions are 
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maintained, The first assumption is implicit in the definition of o(·). 
Assumption 1: Values are linear in the object, in the sense 
that if an individual receives a share ai of item j, the value of that 
share to him is a
i 
v
i 
j. 
Assumption 2: Values are constant and known with certainty. 
This assumption limits the comparability of the results of this paper 
with the results found in the standard bidding literature (e.g. Wilson 
(1977)). However, insight into the case where values are uncertain 
may well require a full understanding of 'the certainty case if budget 
constraints exist. 
The assumption that values are constant precludes the 
possibility that winning item 1 affects the value of item 2. 
This restriction is strong, for it excludes auctions for complementary 
items (e.g. bidding on a left shoe and a right shoe) and "duplicates" 
such as the extreme case in which a bidder attaches positive value only 
8 to the first item won, and resale is impossible or costly. 
Assumption 3: I > 2, J � 2, and all items j 
auctioned simultaneously. 
1, , , , ,J are 
The first part of this assumption merely rules out trivial 
:t2 
cases. The second part of the assumption rules out sequential auctions. 
For interesting examples of sequential auctions and some analysis about 
their characteristics see Englebrecht-Wiggins (1977). 9 
J 
Assumption 4: I 
j=l 
v�.
10 
J 
This assumption is a necessary condition for the budget constraint to 
be binding. 
In the analysis that follows, three types of symmetries 
appear. They provide a convenient classification of the cases which must 
be examined. 
The first type of symmetry, (Sl) , is between values of the items 
to each person. Are the items the same? In this situation, for each 
individual, i, 
v� vi v j , k (Sl) J k 
although it may be the case that 
v� f v� for some i, j, k. J ]. 
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A second symmetry, (S2) , exists if the value of each item j, 
is the same for all individuals. That is 
vi j v i,k 
although it may be the case that 
Vi 4 vi f i · k j r k or some , J , • 
(S2) 
The third type of symmetry, (S3) , exists if all individuals 
have the same budget constraint. That is 
(S3) 
A second mode of classification is the scope of the market. 
How many items are auctioned off simultaneously? Finally, a third 
mode of classification is the depth of the market. How many participants 
are involved in the market? As will become apparent, these last two 
characteristics of the auction market, scope and depth, interact in 
very interesting ways and largely determine whether solutions to the 
auction game exist. 
In what follows, an attempt is made to specify exactly when 
Nash equilibria exist and to characterize these Nash equilibria in terms 
of symmetry, profitability, and other criteria. 
V. SYMMETRIC BIDDING STRATEGIES 
Theorem 1: 1 1  Assume I =  2, J = 2 and conditions (S2) , (S3) are satisfied. 
There will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium pure strategy at 
where 
1 0 2 0 
The proof of Theorem 1 requires a number of initial 
observations to be made. 
Lemma 1: If I =  2, J � 2 and (S2) , (S3) are satisfied, then in 
equilibrium, o1 2 C1 • 
Proof: Suppose o1 f o2. We can assume without loss of generality 
1 < b2 that b1 1. This implies that bidder 2 could be better off 
b'dd' b
2 i 1 H 'f l 4 2 ( l 2) · i ing 1 - E on tern , ence, i o r o , then o , o is not a 
Nash strategy pair. 
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(*) 
0 
Lemma 2: If I 2, J � 2 and (S2) , (S3) are satisfied, then in 
J 
equilibrium l 
j=l 
Proof: Suppose that 
Lemma 1. The payoff 
7f M+ 
J 
b7 
J 
b: I I < 
j=l J j=l J 
for each individual 
J 
jil (Vj - bj) 
2 
M, which we can assume from 
is 
since they tie on each item, (Note that because bids, values and budgets 
are identical Lhe superscripts can be ignored,) 
By Assumption 4 we know that bk < Vk for some k. Hence, 
because budgets are not exahausted, player 1 can bid bk + £ on that 
item, and receive a new profit of 
1T' 
J 
E (V. - b. ) 
j=l J J 
j#k 
The effect on profits of raising b
k 
by £ is: 
1T' - 1T 
vk - bk vk - bk - £ - 2 
Since Vk - bk > O, there exists an £ small enough so that 
1Tl - 1T >
'
o. Hence the original bid configuration was not a Nash
equilibrium, and so Nash strategies must be full. 
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D 
Lemma 3: Assume I =  2, J = 2 and conditions (S2) , (S3) are satisfied. Let 
(bi, b�) and b� �bi. If (a1, a1) is an equilibrium strategy pair, then
Proof: Since, by assumption, (a1, a1) is an equilibrium, it must be
the case that no unilateral bid change can make that agent better off. 
Since equilibrium strategies are full, and strategies are symmetric, any 
unilateral change of bid necessarily means that each individual wins exactly 
one item. Assume that the conclusion of Lemma 3 is not true, e. g. , that 
b2 is not equal to zero and that (V1 - b1) f (V2 - b2) .  Without loss
of generality, let V1 - bl > V2 - b2. The profit resulting from a
1 
is given by 
If a bidder now bids a2 (b1 + £, b2 - £), the profit becomes
16 
for small enough £. 1 2 Hence (a ,a ) is not an equilibrium strategy pair. 
Thus, for a1 to be an equilibrium, either b2 equals zero or (vi - bi) 
(V� - b�) ,  hence 
The proof of Theorem 1 follows immediately from Lemma 2 and 
D 
Lemma 3, which produce two equations in two unknowns, b1 and b2, subject 
to the constraint that b1, b2 are nonnegative: 
This establishes that if a Nash equilibrium pure strategy exists, 
it must satisfy (*) . 
To show that (*) in fact is a Nash equilibrium can be 
demonstrated by showing that if one agent uses (*) , the other can 
make himself no better off by using a strategy other than (*) . We 
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need consider only the following two cases: 
Case 1: Nonnegativity constraints are not binding. Fix bidder l's 
strategy at (*). If bidder 2 bids something different, he wins at 
most one item. His profit then is: 
1f I v. - b. where b. > bl!<. 
J J J J 
V. - bl!< 
Hence 1f I vj - b < 2 
J J 1f*. j 2 
Case 2: Some nonnegativity constraint is binding. Player A 
bids (O,M). Suppose player B bids (a, b) where a >  O, b < M. 
Then his profit is [V1 - a].  Since the nonnegativity constraint is 
binding, it must be the case that 
which implies that 
If a > O, then 
The LHS of the last inequality is player B's profit if strategy (*) 
is adopted, so (*) is an equilibrium. 
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Thus we have shown that (*) characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium 
strategy configuration to this bidding game. 
Theorem 2 : Assume I 2, J 2 and conditions (S2), (S3) are 
satisfied. If there are at least 3 items, j = 1,2, 3 such that it 
is possible to have 
where b1, b2, b3 are all non-negative and 
then a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium cannot exist. 
D 
Proof: 12 By Lemma 3, we know that a necessary condition for a Nash
equilibrium when the bid non-negativity constraints are not binding is: 
Assume that o1 o2 
equilibrium strategy I-tuple. 
I = o = (b1, • • .  , bJ) is a Nash
1 I Let E = (o , • • •  , o ). Without loss 
of generality, assume that b1, . . .  , bK are all positive, where J 
3 _:::. K _:::. J, and E b
J
. = M > O.
j=l 
Let 1f* be the payoff each participant receives under 
this strategy I-tuple:. 
Let 
and 
so 
J 
l I I (V. - b . ) + M • j=l J J 
K 
n* = I i (V - b. ) K j=l I j J 
J 1 nj = l I (V. - b. ) j=l{+l J J 
* * * 1T 1TK + 1T J + M 
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Since E is a Nash equilibrium I-tuple, it must be the case that 
no agent can unilaterally receive a larger profit by departing from E.  
In particular, an agent cannot reduce the bid on one item, redistribute 
it over other items and receive a greater profit. Suppose an agent bids 
bk - e: on item K < J and increases the bids on items 1 
£ through K - 1 by K _ 1 The new profit is: 
n Kf [v. 
j=l J J 
J 1 
(b + £ ) + \' (V - b . ) + M • J. � l I j J j=K+l 
This fails to improve j;he payoff:,associated with E if and only if 
< 1 I 
K I (V. - b.) 
j=l J J 
This is true for all £ > 0 if and only if 
K-1 K 
l (V j - b j) < .! l (V.  - b. ) j=l I j=l J J 
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However, in order for E to have been a Nash equilibrium, 
this condition must hold not only for item K, but for all items k 
E , { 1, • , • K } • Thus we have 
K 
l. 1 
K 
[V. - b. )  � i I (Vj - bj) J J 
- j=l j=l 
jfk 
These can be rewritten as 
K 
(I - 1) �
j=l 
jfk 
Summing these K inequalities, we obtain 
K K 
(I - 1) l I 
k=l j:l 
jf k 
K 
=> (K - l) (I - 1) I 
j=l 
[V. - b . )  J J 
[V. J - b . )  J 
� 
< 
K I 
j=l 
K 
I 
j=l 
=> (K - 1) (I - 1) � 1 
[Vj 
[V. J 
k=l, . • •  ,K 
- b. JJ 
- b,) J 
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Hence, in multiple-object auctions if either K > 2 or I > 2, symmetric 
Nash equilibrium pure strategies cannot exist. 
Example: Bidding With a Reservation Bid Requirement 
In this example the concept of a reservation price is 
0 
introduced. The auctioneer requires a minimum bid he will accept. In 
this situation, Nash equilibrium bidding strategies may not exist. 
Let I 2, J 2 
BR = reservation bid 
Assume 82 and 83 hold. 
Theorem 3: Nash equilibrium pure strategies do not exist if BR < 
V 2 
2 
and M + V 2 < V l < M + V 2 + (V 2 - 2BR) . 
Proof: The strategy of the proof is to look at the boundary solutions. 
By the earlier theorem we know that the unconstrained problem has a 
solution: 
(M,O). 
Under this strategy pair each individual payoff is equal to 
Til TI2 = TI 
22 
under the old rule (i. e. B = R O). 
However, if BR > o, then 
V - M M + v1 
M + 1 Til TI 2 TI 2 
= --
2
-
Now, by assumption 
V < M + V + (V2 - 2B ) l 2 R 
which implies that 
v
1 - M V2 - BR
> -2
--
M + V 
2 
The left hand side of the inequality can be achieved 
unilaterally by either player (say player 1) simply by changing his 
bid to 
where 
i t bid less than M on item Player two now has an incent ve o 
1, in fact he will want to bid as low as A. Now, we need to check if 
"l 0 ,..2 0 
23 
is a Nash equilibrium pure strategy. 13 This is not a NaGh strategy pair 
because 
so by lemma 3, the bidder has an incentive to cut his bid on item 2 and 
increase his bid on item 1. In fact, this will be the case whenever 
b1 � O. Since the boundary solution (b1 
equilibrium, the claim is demonstrated. 
O) does not support a Nash 
D 
VI. ASYMMETRIC BIDDING STRATEGIES 
Two questions immediately arise. When do asymmetric Nash 
equilibrium pure strategies exist, and what form do they take when they 
do exist. A first observation, that there are conditions where 
asymmetric Nash equilibria exist, can be made with reference to an 
example. This case is rather trivial, in the sense that no agent earns 
a profit. 
Example 1: Suppose there are three agents and three items. The agents 
all have identical budget constraints and identical values 
4.0 i = 1,2, 3; j 1, 2,3.
The following bid configuration is a Nash equilibrium. 
24 
Example 3: 
�ms 
Bidder 1 2 3 
1 4 4 2 
2 2 4 4 I 3 4 2 4 
One can immediately see that no agent earns a profit, because all winning 
bids are at the value of the item. Furthermore, one can see why it is 
a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, for any Nash equilibrium, there have to be 
at least two bidders tied for the highest bid on eath item. Otherwise 
the winning bidder would have an incentive to cut the winning bid to just 
barely above the bid of the nearest competitor. This is stated more 
clearly below. 
Lemma 4:  Assume S2, I > 2. 
If E = (a1, ... ,a1) is a Nash equilibrium pure strategy I-tuple, then
there must be at least two bidders tied for the highest bid on each item. 
Proof: Let E be a Nash equilibrium pure strategy K-tuple. 
Further suppose that for some (i, j) , b� > b� V k 1 i. Then the payoff
for item j to individual i is 
v� - bi 
J j 
Agent i can earn more profit on item j by bidding b� - £,J 
i 
for some £ small enough so that bj - £ is still the winning bid on
item j. Agent i then receives 
v� 
J 
b� + E > 1T J ij 
This contradicts the assumption that E is an equilibrium. 
25 
Example 1 demonstrates the "high-low" class of strategies, 
D 
in which people bid up to their value on some items and very little on 
the other items. In fact, bidder 1 is indifferent between bidding 2 on 
the third item and bidding any number between 0 and 2 on that item, 
Thus the example has an infinite number of pure strategy equilibria, of 
the form b1 
= b
j 
= 4, bk = a where a E [0,2]. 
One wonders if such "high-low" equilibrium strategies ever 
exist which support positive profits. This question can be answered in 
the affirmative, by giving an example. 
Example l: 
6.0 
4. 0 
Consider the strategies: 
�s 
B 1 2 3 
1 3 3 0 
2 0 3 3 
3 3 0 3 
One can see that no player can make larger profits by departing from this 
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strategy. On the other hand, we can easily construct an example in which 
no such equilibrium exists. For instance if the auction includes a fourth 
player with the same parameters as the other agents, a Nash equilibrium 
no longer exists. 
Another feature of asymmetric solutions to symmetrically 
parameterized auctions is that no agent can win more than 2 of the items 
for which both the winning bid and the net profit are strictly positive. 
Lemma 5: Assume S2, S3, I:: 2, J > 3;· Let E = (o1
, . . .  ,oI) be an
equilibrium. If an agent, i, earns profits greater than 0 under E, 
then i can win at most two of the items i submitted positive bids on. 
Proof: Suppose that agent i is tied with other bidders on three items, 
1, 2, and 3, earning profits at most: 
3 
l 
j=l 
Suppose, without loss of generality, that 
and bi + E bi + � on the second and third items, then profits become: 2 2• 3 2 
b� ) 1 
for some E > O. 
3 
- E > l 
j=l 
(Vj - b� ) l i 1 2 
An additional proposition is demonstrated below: 
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Lemma 6: Assume S2, S3, l � 2, J � 2. Let E = (a1, ... ,a1) be an 
equilibrium. If i earns positive profits under E, then if bi j 
.£or some k � i, then bi = O. j 
Proof: If bi. > O, then agent i can bid b
i 
- £ on j and bi + £ on 
J j k 
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some item k for which b� is tied for the winning bid. Agent i will then
be the sole highest bidder on item k thereby capturing all of its 
value. 
In addition, from Lemma 3 an agent i must be earning equal 
profits on the items i wins with a positive bid. That is 
whenever i is a winner in the jth and � items, These restrictions 
are really quite strong, and seem to limit to only a few special cases 
the situations in which asymmetric Nash equilibria exist that generate 
positive profits when 3 or more people bid for 3 or more items. 
As stated above, Nash solutions generally are not unique. 
In particular, example 1 has six permutations of the given individual 
strategies, all of which are Nash equilibria. Given that this is the 
case, how would an individual decide which strategy to use? In this 
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situation one can hardly expect a Nash equilibrium to be achieved by non-
cooperative behavior, because the agents must, in a sense, agree 
beforehand which equilibrium strategy I-tuple to play. 
The preceeding discussion assumes symmetry in agents and 
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values of items. The following example shows that i f  budget constraints 
are "not too binding," it is the symmetry between individuals, rather 
than symmetry between items, which leads to the existence of non-unique 
Nash equilibria. Suppose that the individuals are identical and v1, v2 
have the greatest value. Furthermore, suppose that there are fewer items 
then there are bidders, Also, assume that M � v1 + V2 . Then a Nash 
equilibrium exists. But if there are "too many" more items than bidders, 
so that the budget constraint makes it impossible for at least 2 agents 
to bid their value on each item, then Nash equilibria may not exist. The 
,following sequence of examples illustrates these points. 
Example 3a: I = 3 J 
5 
3 
2 
8 
3 
Vi 
Vi 
Vi 
Vi 
One permutation of Nash strategy triples is shown below: 
r�s Bidder 1 2 3 
1 5 1 2 
2 3 3 2 
3 5 3 0 
Example 3b: Same parameters as example 3a, except that 
M 7.
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By reducing the budgets no Nash equilibrium exists. The reason is that 
it is no longer possible for any participant to bid the full value of 
items one and two simultaneously. 
On the other hand, if there are four bidders with these 
parameters, Nash equilibria do exist. One such bid configuration is 
shown in the following table. 
Example Jc: 
�s 
Bidder 1 2 3 
1 5 0 2 
2 5 0 2 
3 2 3 2 
4 2 3 2 
In both 3a and 3c the Nash equilibria all generated zero 
profits. This will always be the case when values are different across 
items (but identical across individuals) budgets are identical, and 
both the number of items and the number of bidders is greater than two. 
This is stated more precisely in the next theorem. 
Theorem 4: Let I ::: 3, J ::: 3. Assume S2, S3
If 
(1) 
(2) everyone submits positive bids on at least 2 items; 
(3) all items are bid on, 
then at any Nash equilibrium pure strategy I-tuple, E (01, . . . ,or)' 
b� J 0 i 1, . . .  ,I
where 
{j I b� ::: b� k=l, . • .  , I} 
Proof: Suppose that some agent, i, makes a positive profit. First 
we show that in equilibrium this agent must make an equal profit on 
all items for which he submitted a positive winning bid. 
Suppose that agent i has submitted winning bids on K items, 
and does not earn an equal profit on all K items. From Lemma 4, in 
equilibrium at least two agents must have submitted winning bids on 
each of these items. From lemma 5 and lemma 6 we know that agent i 
submitted strictly positive winning bids on at least two items, say 
j and k. Suppose, without loss of generality, 
i i i v. - b > v 
J j k 
Then i can earn greater profits by bidding slightly more on j and 
slightly less on k, since V� b� > .l (V� - bi+ Vi - bki) .  J 2 J j k 
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In fact, in equilibrium, if the budget constraint is binding, 
all strictly positive bids must be winning bids, by lemma 6. Since all 
agents have the same budget and the same values, it must be the case that 
* * 
where bj and bk are the winning bids of j and k, respectively. 
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Therefore, if A and B are the two least valuable items, then 
* * 
bA + bB < M 
* * 
where bA and bB are the win
ning bids on items A and B. In this case any 
* * 
agent c·an obtain greater profits by bidding b A + £ on A, bB + £ on B,
and 0 on all other items. This contradicts the Nash assumption, so 
the theorem is proven. 
Assumption (2) in the statement of the theorem is actually 
stated just to rule out two special cases. One such case occurs if 
one item is so much less valuable than the other items that nobody 
bids on it. Referring back to example 4, if there were a fourth item 
D 
- 1 valued at 8 , then the following bid configuration is a Nash equilibrium. 
Example 4: 
� 1 2 3 4 r 
1 3 3 0 0 
2 0 3 3 0 
3 3 0 3 0 
Each agent is bidding on at least two items. H 11 · · owever, a items receiving 
positive bids have the same value, so we are essentially back in the 
"identical value" type of auction. An alternative assumption to avoid 
this special case is that 
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where Va os the highest value of all items and VS is the second 
highest value (Va f VS). A third possibility is to require that 
The second special case to rule out is when some players bid on 
only one very valuable item, One way this can occur is if every item 
is more valuable than the budget of each agent. In this case a Nash 
equilibrium may exist in which each agent's entire budget is bid on one 
item,.as in the following example. 
Example 5: 
M 15 
A Nash equilibrium strategy 6-tuple is: 
� Bidder 1 2 3. 
1 6 0 0 
2 6 0 0 
3 0 6 0 
4 0 0 6 
5 0 6 0 
6 0 0 6 
This special case is ruled out by considering only cases in 
which everyone bids on at least two items. It is actually only 
necessary to require that at least one individual bid on more than one item, 
The point of this discussion has been to demonstrate that 
assumption (2) in the theorem is not as strong as it may at first 
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appear. There exist fairly weak sufficient conditions for (2) to hold. 
Furthermore, it rules out cases which are, for the most part uninteresting. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated several properties of Nash 
equilibria in multiple-object simultaneous sealed-bid auctions in which 
the participants face a constraint on exposure. First of all it has 
been shown that if there are more than two bidders and more than two 
objects, symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria do not exist. Second, 
the presence of a reservation bid requirement can also result in the 
nonexistence of Nash equilibria, even if there are only two bidders and 
two objects. Third, when there are more than two bidders and two objects, 
sufficient conditions were derived for Nash equilibria to result in 
zero profits to the buyers. The conditions were fairly weak, indicating 
that when a Nash equilibrium exists, profits will often be zero. 
The lack of symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria is 
particularly interesting. The implication is that Nash equilibria, 
when they exist, can be realistically achieved only if the bidders 
cooperate with each other. Referring back to example 3, bidder 1 
will submit (4, 4,2) only if he knows bidders 2 and 3 will submit 
(4. 2. 4) and 2. 4. 4) . Otherwise, the first agent's optimal response will 
be something else. Collusion is required for the buyers to coordinate 
their bids. Such collusion, unlike prisoner's dilemma situations which 
characterize many collusive arrangements such as cartels, is stable, for 
the point of collusion is a Nash equilibrium. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. In the analysis that follows, it is assumed that secondary markets 
do not exist. 
2. Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971), pp. 642-643. 
3. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1979) cite a congressional study 
(1976), "An Analysis of the Economic Inpact of the Current OCS 
Bidding System," prepared for Representative Hughes (D. N. J. ) .
4. This is perhaps analogous to the "market for lemons" problem in 
which the bad drives out the good. In this case, one would expect 
resale value for even very good tracts to be far below the cash
bonus originally paid for them.
S. See Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1979), p. 37; and Cook, Kirby, and
Mehndiratta (197S), p. 729 ff. 
6. This connection was first noticed by Sakaguchi (1962). 
7. Blackett (19S4), p. SS. 
8. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1979) deal with auctions in which 
the items were duplicates. 
9. Of particular interest is his brief discussion of horse auction. 
See also Schotter (1974), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1977), and ·Brams 
and Straffin (1979). 
10. This merely rules out trivial cases. 
11. This theorem can be found in Sakaguchi (1962), where it was first 
stated.
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12. Although lemma 3 was proved for the two-bidder, two-item case, one 
can easily see that the "equal profits condition" is necessary for
an equilibrium in the n-bidder, m-item case as long as non-negativity 
constraints on bids are· not binding. If profits are not.equal 
between two items which an agent submits positive bids on, then the 
agent has an incentive to bid slightly lower on the item with less 
profit and slightly higher on the item which has a greater profit.
13. We need not examine (A,B'.) whereR 
because either agent could unilaterally bid A +  � and be better off. 
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